The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation marked its 25th anniversary this week with a summit that laid bare the fundamental contradictions tearing at a bloc designed to counter Western influence, as its three most powerful members revealed strategic priorities that have moved decisively in different directions.
Chinese President Xi Jinping, Russian President Vladimir Putin, and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi attended the gathering in Astana, Kazakhstan, representing nations whose competing interests have strained the cohesion of an organization spanning roughly a quarter of the globe. The contrast between their stated positions and private ambitions underscored a reality that regional analysts have long noted: the SCO, for all its demographic and geographic weight, functions more as a diplomatic venue than a unified political force.
The summit concluded without the kind of joint declaration on major international crises that participants once aspired to produce. Instead, the three leaders departed having demonstrated more strategic distance than alignment on questions ranging from the Ukraine conflict to trade policy to regional security architecture in South and Central Asia.
What Happened
The Astana summit brought together heads of state from eight member nations: China, Russia, India, Pakistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. Observers from several additional countries, including Belarus, Mongolia, and Iran, also participated in various capacities. The gathering commemorated the organization’s founding in 2001, when the SCO emerged from earlier security arrangements focused on border disputes and counter-terrorism cooperation among China, Russia, and four Central Asian states.
This year’s proceedings followed a familiar pattern. Bilateral meetings between Xi and Putin produced joint statements emphasizing what the two governments described as a “strategic partnership” amid what they characterized as American attempts to preserve unipolar global dominance. Xi used the occasion to promote Beijing’s vision of a “community of shared future for mankind,” language that has become standard in Chinese diplomatic communiqués but rings increasingly hollow to observers tracking actual policy convergence.
Putin, for his part, has sought to leverage the SCO platform to project an image of international legitimacy at a time when Western sanctions have isolated Moscow from most major economies. The Russian president arrived in Astana having just visited North Korea and Vietnam, part of an effort to demonstrate that his diplomatic options remain broader than Western assessments suggest.
Modi’s participation followed a distinct trajectory. The Indian prime minister held separate meetings with Xi and Putin, but his public remarks emphasized New Delhi’s commitment to what Indian officials term “strategic autonomy”—a formulation that has allowed India to deepen cooperation with Western democracies while maintaining engagement with Russia and China. India has purchased Russian oil at discounted rates throughout the Ukraine conflict while simultaneously participating in the Quad grouping with the United States, Japan, and Australia.
Why It Matters
The SCO’s struggles to project unified positions carry implications that extend well beyond the organization’s formal communiqués. The bloc collectively encompasses nearly 3 billion people and spans territory from the Pacific coast of China to the western borders of Russia, encompassing Central Asian nations whose decisions on energy transit, trade routes, and security partnerships will shape Eurasian geopolitics for decades.
The divergence among Xi, Putin, and Modi reflects deeper structural tensions that no amount of diplomatic choreography can fully obscure. China’s rise has unsettled the strategic calculus that once made Moscow and Beijing natural partners in opposition to American predominance. Russia, weakened by economic sanctions and military overextension in Ukraine, has become increasingly dependent on Chinese goodwill—a dynamic that Russian policymakers recognize and resent, even as they publicly maintain the appearance of partnership.
India’s position within this configuration has grown more complex with each passing year. New Delhi views China’s territorial expansionism and infrastructure lending in South Asia with growing concern, yet remains bound to Russia by decades of defense cooperation and a relationship with Pakistan that complicates any full alignment with Beijing’s preferences. Meanwhile, India’s economic integration with Western economies has accelerated, creating stakes that its SCO partners view with varying degrees of skepticism.
The summit also exposed the limits of what scholars have termed “negative consolidation”—multilateral organizations built primarily around opposition to an external power rather than shared positive objectives. The SCO was conceived in an era when opposition to American unipolarity seemed a sufficient unifying principle. Two and a half decades later, the organization has proven incapable of translating that shared objection into coherent collective action.
Background and Context
The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation traces its origins to the “Shanghai Five” grouping formed in 1996, which addressed border demarcation and security concerns among China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. The organization’s formal establishment in 2001 coincided with the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, a moment that appeared to validate the bloc’s focus on terrorism and regional stability. Early summits produced meaningful cooperation on border management and confidence-building measures between the Central Asian members.
The organization’s expansion in 2017, when India and Pakistan joined as full members, was initially heralded as a sign of growing relevance. The addition of South Asia’s two nuclear-armed rivals created new complications, however, and the India-Pakistan relationship has remained a source of friction rather than unity within SCO proceedings.
China’s Belt and Road Initiative has complicated the bloc’s economics. Beijing’s infrastructure lending across Central Asia and beyond has generated both economic integration and resentment, as smaller members struggle with debt burdens and questions about sovereignty. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, which traverses disputed Kashmir, has particularly rankled India, which refuses to acknowledge the project as legitimate.
Russia’s isolation following the 2022 invasion of Ukraine has accelerated tendencies that were already visible. Moscow’s diplomatic calendar has become increasingly dependent on engagements with China and other non-Western partners, lending the SCO an importance in Russian foreign policy that it does not necessarily possess in Chinese strategic thinking. Xi, by most accounts, views Russia as a useful counterweight to American pressure but not as an equal partner in any emerging world order Beijing envisions.
India’s role has evolved most dramatically. Long skeptical of the organization’s focus on security cooperation that India views as targeting Western engagement in Afghanistan and Central Asia, New Delhi has participated selectively while maintaining distance from joint positions on international crises. Indian officials have made clear that membership in the SCO does not imply alignment with Chinese or Russian positions on Ukraine, Taiwan, or other flashpoints.
What to Watch Next
The trajectory of divergence is unlikely to reverse in the near term. China’s economic and military capabilities continue to grow, reducing Moscow’s relevance as a counterweight to American power while increasing Beijing’s leverage over Russia. India’s strategic autonomy will likely become more pronounced as its economy deepens integration with Western supply chains and technology partnerships. The Central Asian states will continue navigating between their larger neighbors, seeking to preserve independence of action while avoiding becoming pawns in great-power competition.
The SCO’s institutional capacity faces constraints as well. The organization lacks the budget, staff, and enforcement mechanisms that characterize more effective multilateral bodies. Its decisions are generally declaratory rather than binding, and implementation depends entirely on member compliance. The bloc has failed to develop the kind of institutional infrastructure—dispute resolution mechanisms, shared regulatory frameworks, financial institutions—that would give substance to its collective pronouncements.
The question of expansion may test the organization further. Iran’s full membership, finalized in 2023, adds another dimension of complexity given Tehran’s confrontations with Western powers and its own regional ambitions. Turkey’s observer status and growing economic ties with Central Asian nations create additional competition for influence that the SCO structure was not designed to manage.
Bilateral relationships among the three principal members will likely continue to develop along their current trajectories regardless of SCO proceedings. The Xi-Putin alignment will deepen out of mutual necessity even as it remains asymmetrical. India’s engagement with Washington, Tokyo, and Brussels will expand as New Delhi seeks technology transfer, investment, and security cooperation that SCO membership cannot provide. The organization will continue to serve as a forum for dialogue and a vehicle for symbolic messaging, but its capacity to shape events will remain circumscribed by the fundamental divisions among its most powerful members.
Analysis:
The SCO’s difficulty in projecting unified positions reflects a broader challenge facing multilateral organizations built on negative consolidation rather than shared positive goals. While the bloc has coordinated on counter-terrorism and border security, its members’ competing interests have consistently prevented the kind of coherent strategic messaging its founders envisioned.
The timing of this anniversary underscores the organization’s limited evolution over 25 years. The world’s geopolitical landscape has transformed dramatically since 2001, yet the SCO remains largely defined by what it opposes rather than what it proposes. The bloc’s members cannot agree on fundamental questions of international order, which limits its capacity to act as anything more than a talking shop when genuine strategic choices arise.
The divergence among Xi, Putin, and Modi points to a fundamental tension within the organization: China and Russia have grown closer amid shared opposition to Western sanctions and policies, while India has increasingly sought partnerships with the United States, European Union, and Japan. This dynamic raises questions about the SCO’s long-term relevance. A quarter of the world’s landmass and population may fall within the organization’s membership, but that demographic weight has yet to translate into commensurate geopolitical influence or coherent policy positions.
For now, the SCO endures as a diplomatic fixture, a place where leaders meet and issue statements that mask rather than resolve their differences. Whether the organization can evolve beyond this limitation remains uncertain. The structural forces pulling its members apart appear stronger than any impulse toward genuine cohesion.
Sources
The Conversation (https://theconversation.com/xi-putin-and-modi-looking-in-different-directions-as-shanghai-cooperation-organisation-marks-25th-anniversary-291058)
Source: The Conversation – Global
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Story synopsis gathered from: The Conversation – Global — source
