Ra’am party leader Mansour Abbas has aligned with Israeli candidate Segalovich ahead of upcoming elections, a calculated move that analysts say is designed to increase Arab political representation in coalition politics by leveraging partnerships with Zionist political figures. The partnership reflects Abbas’s continued pursuit of a pragmatic course that has reshaped the role of Palestinian citizens of Israel within the country’s governing arrangements.
What happened
The alliance positions Abbas, who heads the United Arab List (Ra’am), alongside Segalovich, an Israeli candidate running on a Zionist platform. The pairing is unusual in a political environment where cross-camp cooperation between Arab-majority parties and right-leaning or nationalist Jewish candidates has historically been rare.
Under the arrangement, the two figures are expected to coordinate on voter outreach and coalition-building strategy, with Abbas seeking to convert the electoral weight of Palestinian citizens of Israel into binding commitments from prospective governing partners. Segalovich, according to the framing advanced by Ra’am, gains access to a segment of the electorate that mainstream Zionist parties have often struggled to court and have at times openly discouraged from participating in coalition politics.
The specifics of any joint slate, formal endorsement, or seat-sharing arrangement have not been publicly detailed beyond the reported alignment between the two camps. The move comes ahead of elections in which Arab political participation, turnout, and coalition arithmetic are again expected to play a decisive role in determining the next Israeli government.
Why it matters
The alliance matters because it tests whether the political gains secured by Ra’am since 2021 can be institutionalized rather than treated as a one-off exception. In that year, Ra’am became the first Arab-majority party to join an Israeli governing coalition, sitting in the short-lived Bennett-Lapid government. The decision delivered tangible benefits, including increased funding for infrastructure and crime-reduction initiatives in Arab-majority towns and cities, but it also deepened internal Palestinian political criticism of Abbas’s leadership.
Abbas’s bet on Segalovich is, in effect, a bet that working with a Zionist political actor willing to publicly engage with an Arab-led party is a more reliable path to policy outcomes than either boycotting coalition politics or relying solely on Arab-to-Arab electoral coordination. It also reflects a structural reality of Israeli politics: no government can be formed without a majority of Knesset members, and Arab parties have often held the balance of power in close elections without being invited into governing coalitions.
For Palestinian citizens of Israel, who comprise roughly one-fifth of the population, the central question is whether participation in coalition politics produces durable improvements in housing, employment, municipal services, and policing, or whether the strategy merely extracts short-term concessions while leaving the underlying political asymmetries intact.
Background and context
Ra’am’s political trajectory under Abbas has been defined by a willingness to break with long-standing Arab-party orthodoxy, which historically emphasized opposition to coalition participation on grounds that participation legitimized the Israeli state without securing Palestinian national goals. The 2021 coalition experiment changed that calculation by demonstrating that Arab parties could extract concrete benefits from a willing prime minister willing to treat them as a legitimate governing partner, even if that partner ultimately exited after a brief tenure.
Since then, Abbas has faced persistent criticism from rival Arab-list politicians, including members of the Joint List and Balad, who argue that coalition engagement has compromised Palestinian political positions on issues such as settlement construction, home demolitions, and the broader question of Palestinian self-determination. Abbas has countered that policy gains in Arab-majority localities have been substantial and that refusing to participate in government leaves those communities without a direct voice in budget and legislative decisions.
The choice to align with Segalovich, rather than with a center-left Zionist figure, signals that Abbas is prioritizing coalition viability over ideological alignment. Right-leaning or nationalist parties often attract floating voters that center-left formations cannot capture, and a willingness to work with such parties could, in theory, expand the range of governments in which Ra’am could plausibly participate.
The strategy also carries risks on both sides. Hardline elements within the Arab political camp may frame the cooperation as normalization that dilutes Palestinian political demands. Within the Israeli right, segments of the coalition’s base may view association with an Arab-led party as a betrayal of nationalist commitments, particularly at a moment when questions about Palestinian political representation are politically charged.
Analysis:
The partnership with Segalovich suggests Abbas is testing whether cross-camp alliances can be expanded beyond a single coalition arrangement. The bet is high-conviction: Abbas is staking political credibility on the proposition that a significant segment of the Israeli electorate is willing to accept, and even reward, explicit Arab-Zionist political cooperation.
That proposition is not self-evidently correct. Turnout among Palestinian citizens of Israel has fluctuated significantly across recent election cycles, and when turnout falls, the leverage of Arab parties in coalition negotiations falls with it. Abbas’s ability to deliver his base to the polls is therefore a precondition for the strategy’s success, and his recent history of engaging governing coalitions has produced both new voters and disaffected ones.
For mainstream Zionist parties, the more uncomfortable question is whether they will accept an Arab coalition partner under less exceptional political circumstances than those that produced the 2021 government. Past precedent suggests that even when Arab parties have been mathematically indispensable, larger coalition partners have preferred to bring them into informal support arrangements rather than formal governing coalitions. Abbas’s alignment with Segalovich appears designed to pre-empt that dynamic by building a working relationship with a Jewish political actor before rather than after an election.
The incentive structure on the Israeli right is also worth examining. Parties that incorporate or formally align with Arab political figures risk alienating parts of their own base. They may, however, gain something that nationalist competitors cannot easily replicate: a credible claim to governing viability in a fragmented Knesset. Whether that trade is acceptable to Segalovich’s own party, and to its voters, will become clearer as the election approaches.
What to watch next
The near-term test is whether the Abbas-Segalovich alignment produces a formal joint arrangement, whether Ra’am fields its own candidates, and whether Segalovich’s party endorses or tolerates the partnership publicly. Statements from both camps in the run-up to candidate lists being finalized will indicate whether the alliance is operational or merely rhetorical.
Turnout among Palestinian citizens of Israel in the next election cycle will be a critical indicator. Higher turnout strengthens Abbas’s bargaining position and validates the coalition-engagement strategy; lower turnout weakens both.
The response of rival Arab parties, particularly Hadash, Balad, and Ta’al, will signal whether Abbas’s approach is becoming a new norm or remains an outlier within Palestinian political organizing inside Israel.
Finally, the willingness of Segalovich’s own party to defend the partnership under public pressure will reveal how durable the alliance is outside of pre-election maneuvering.
Conclusion
Abbas’s alignment with Segalovich represents the latest step in a political strategy that has already reshaped the boundary of what is considered acceptable Arab-party participation in Israeli coalition politics. Whether the strategy yields durable gains for Palestinian citizens of Israel or simply extracts short-term concessions at long-term political cost will depend on turnout, on the discipline of coalition partners, and on the willingness of the broader Israeli political system to treat Arab political representation as a routine rather than exceptional feature of its politics.
Sources
Al Jazeera News: https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2026/9/5/mansour-abbas-is-betting-on-a-zionist-to-make-arab-votes-count?traffic_source=rss
Source: Al Jazeera News
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Story synopsis gathered from: Al Jazeera News — source
