NEW DELHI — A prominent Chinese scholar specializing in South Asia has cautioned that the fundamental tensions shaping India-China relations remain unresolved, despite recent diplomatic efforts to stabilize the border and ease bilateral strains. Hu Shisheng, director of the Institute of South Asian Studies at the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), a think tank affiliated with China’s Ministry of State Security, stated that while both nations are prioritizing stability, the “structural differences” between them have not disappeared. His remarks underscore the persistent challenges in achieving a lasting resolution to the decades-old border dispute and suggest that incremental confidence-building measures, rather than sweeping agreements, will define the near-term trajectory of the relationship.
What Happened
In a recent assessment published in The Hindu, Hu Shisheng argued that the current phase of India-China engagement should focus on institutionalizing mechanisms to prevent conflict rather than pursuing an immediate, comprehensive settlement of their territorial disputes. While acknowledging the progress made in recent military and diplomatic talks—including the disengagement of troops from certain friction points along the Line of Actual Control (LAC)—Hu emphasized that deeper geopolitical, economic, and strategic divergences continue to shape the relationship.
Hu’s comments align with China’s broader diplomatic posture toward India, which has oscillated between conciliatory gestures and assertive signaling. In recent months, both countries have engaged in multiple rounds of high-level talks, including meetings between senior military commanders and diplomatic envoys. However, Hu’s assessment suggests that Beijing views these efforts as a means to manage tensions rather than resolve them, reflecting a pragmatic but cautious approach to one of Asia’s most consequential bilateral relationships.
Why It Matters
The India-China border dispute, which escalated into deadly clashes in the Galwan Valley in 2020, remains one of the most volatile flashpoints in Asia. While the immediate crisis has been contained through disengagement agreements, the underlying issues—including competing territorial claims, infrastructure development along the LAC, and strategic mistrust—persist. Hu’s remarks highlight three critical dimensions of the relationship:
1. Strategic Competition in Asia: India and China are locked in a long-term competition for influence in South Asia, the Indian Ocean, and beyond. China’s expanding footprint through initiatives like the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and its deepening partnerships with Pakistan, Nepal, and Sri Lanka have heightened New Delhi’s concerns about encirclement. Conversely, India’s growing defense ties with the United States, Japan, and Australia—particularly through the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad)—have been viewed with suspicion in Beijing. Hu’s reference to “structural differences” likely alludes to this broader strategic rivalry, which extends beyond the border dispute.
2. Economic Interdependence vs. Strategic Distrust: Despite their political tensions, India and China remain deeply interconnected economically. Bilateral trade exceeded $136 billion in 2025, with China serving as India’s largest trading partner in goods. However, India’s trade deficit with China—estimated at over $85 billion in 2025—has fueled domestic calls for reducing dependence on Chinese imports, particularly in critical sectors like pharmaceuticals, electronics, and telecommunications. Hu’s comments suggest that Beijing recognizes the limits of economic leverage in resolving political disputes, particularly as India diversifies its supply chains and strengthens domestic manufacturing under initiatives like “Make in India” and “Atmanirbhar Bharat” (Self-Reliant India).
3. The Limits of Diplomacy: Hu’s emphasis on stability over settlement reflects a growing recognition in both capitals that a final resolution to the border dispute is unlikely in the near term. The 3,488-kilometer LAC remains poorly demarcated, with both sides holding divergent interpretations of its alignment. Previous attempts at resolution, including the 2005 Agreement on Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the Settlement of the Boundary Question, have stalled due to mutual suspicions and domestic political constraints. Hu’s framing suggests that Beijing is resigned to managing the dispute through confidence-building measures, such as hotlines between military commanders, rather than pursuing a grand bargain.
Background and Context
The India-China relationship has been defined by a mix of cooperation and confrontation since the two nations established diplomatic ties in 1950. The 1962 Sino-Indian War, triggered by a border dispute in the Himalayas, set the tone for decades of mistrust. While the two countries normalized relations in the 1980s and expanded economic ties in the 2000s, the border issue has remained a persistent irritant.
The most recent crisis began in May 2020, when Chinese and Indian troops clashed in the Galwan Valley, resulting in the deaths of 20 Indian soldiers and at least four Chinese personnel. The incident marked the first fatal confrontation between the two sides since 1975 and triggered a series of military standoffs along the LAC. While subsequent disengagement agreements have reduced the immediate risk of conflict, the underlying tensions have not been resolved. Both countries have since reinforced their military positions, with India accelerating infrastructure development in border areas and China expanding its presence in disputed territories.
Hu Shisheng’s background adds weight to his assessment. As a leading scholar at CICIR, one of China’s most influential think tanks on foreign policy, his views are closely aligned with the Chinese government’s strategic outlook. His previous work has focused on India’s foreign policy, regional security dynamics, and China’s engagement with South Asia. His recent remarks can be seen as part of Beijing’s broader effort to shape the narrative around India-China relations, emphasizing pragmatism while downplaying expectations of a breakthrough.
What to Watch Next
Hu’s comments signal that the India-China relationship is entering a phase of prolonged management rather than resolution. Several key developments will shape the trajectory of ties in the coming months:
1. Military and Diplomatic Talks: The 21st round of India-China military commander-level talks, held in February 2026, ended without a joint statement, indicating persistent differences over disengagement in remaining friction points, including Depsang and Demchok. The next round of talks, expected in the coming weeks, will be closely watched for signs of progress. Meanwhile, diplomatic channels, including the Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination on India-China Border Affairs (WMCC), remain active, though their effectiveness in bridging gaps has been limited.
2. Economic and Technological Decoupling: India’s efforts to reduce its dependence on Chinese imports, particularly in sectors like telecommunications (e.g., 5G equipment from Huawei and ZTE) and pharmaceuticals, will continue to strain bilateral ties. In 2025, India imposed stricter scrutiny on Chinese investments in sensitive sectors, citing national security concerns. Beijing has responded with retaliatory measures, including delays in approving Indian pharmaceutical exports to China. The economic dimension of the relationship will likely remain contentious, with both sides seeking to balance interdependence with strategic autonomy.
3. Regional and Global Geopolitics: The India-China rivalry is increasingly playing out in third countries, particularly in South Asia and the Indian Ocean. China’s growing influence in Nepal, Sri Lanka, and the Maldives—through infrastructure projects and debt diplomacy—has prompted India to deepen its own engagement with these nations. Meanwhile, India’s participation in the Quad and its expanding defense partnerships with the U.S. and Europe have been viewed with alarm in Beijing. The upcoming Quad summit, scheduled for later this year, will be a key indicator of how India balances its strategic partnerships with its desire to stabilize ties with China.
4. Domestic Political Considerations: In both countries, domestic politics will influence the trajectory of bilateral relations. In India, the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has adopted a tough stance on China, framing the border dispute as a matter of national sovereignty. Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s government has faced pressure from opposition parties and the public to take a firm line on China, particularly in the aftermath of the Galwan clashes. In China, President Xi Jinping’s consolidation of power and his emphasis on “national rejuvenation” have led to a more assertive foreign policy, including in territorial disputes. Any perceived weakness in dealing with India could be exploited by domestic critics, making compromise politically risky for both leaders.
5. Multilateral Engagements: India and China continue to engage in multilateral forums, including the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), BRICS, and the G20. While these platforms provide opportunities for dialogue, they have done little to address the core issues in the bilateral relationship. The upcoming BRICS summit, to be hosted by Russia in 2026, will test whether the two countries can compartmentalize their differences in the interest of broader cooperation.
Conclusion
Hu Shisheng’s assessment offers a sobering but realistic appraisal of India-China relations. While both countries have managed to prevent further escalation along the LAC, the “structural differences” he highlights—strategic rivalry, economic competition, and unresolved territorial claims—remain formidable obstacles to a lasting settlement. The focus on stability over resolution suggests that the relationship will continue to be defined by cautious engagement, incremental confidence-building measures, and persistent mistrust.
For India, the challenge lies in balancing its strategic partnerships with the West while avoiding a full-blown confrontation with China. For China, the priority is to prevent India from aligning too closely with the U.S. and its allies, even as it seeks to maintain economic ties with New Delhi. The coming months will reveal whether both sides can navigate these competing priorities without allowing tensions to spiral into another crisis. In the absence of a breakthrough, the India-China relationship is likely to remain a study in managed instability—where the absence of conflict is the primary measure of success.
Sources:
– [The Hindu: “India-China talks: ‘Structural differences have not disappeared,’ says Hu Shisheng”](https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/india-china-talks-structural-differences-have-not-disappeared-says-hu-shisheng/article71387073.ece)
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Story synopsis gathered from: The Hindu – National — source
