Houthi rebel forces have taken control of the Yemeni port of Mokha and Mayyun Island, which overlooks the Bab el‑Mandeb strait, giving them direct influence over a key Red Sea oil chokepoint [F1]. Tehran’s involvement now extends to roughly 12 percent of global trade that passes through the waterway [F2], while pressure on the nearby Strait of Hormuz has already cut oil flows there from about 9 million barrels a day to a range of 3.7 million‑6.4 million barrels [F3].
The bloc of “emerging economies” known as BRICS, founded in 2006 by Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, has added six permanent members—Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Indonesia—bringing the total to 21 nations [F4][F5]. According to its own figures, BRICS now accounts for 49.5 percent of the world’s population, 40 percent of global gross domestic product and 26 percent of global trade [F6].
The ongoing Middle‑East conflict is exposing deep divisions within the enlarged group [F7]. The New Delhi declaration, issued by India’s BRICS chair, makes no reference to the Red Sea, Bab el‑Mandeb, Yemen or the Houthis, underscoring the lack of a unified stance [F8]. Shipping traffic that underpins the bloc’s trade revenue fell sharply in early 2024 after an earlier Houthi campaign against Red Sea lanes and has struggled to recover [F9]. Insurers have classified the route as high‑risk for months, and the resulting higher costs are expected to continue deterring vessels from using the Red Sea [F10][F11].
The United Arab Emirates has claimed that Iran launched 3,000 missiles and drones at it during the first two months of the U.S.‑led war against Iran [F12]. Both countries rely heavily on the Red Sea corridor, a route that the Northern Sea Route through the Arctic is unlikely to replace in the near term [F13].
Russia, whose exports travel by alternative pathways, appears to benefit economically as Iranian‑controlled chokepoints tighten [F14]. In testimony to U.S. lawmakers this month, both Russia and China were identified as supporters of the Houthis alongside Iran [F15]. Russian personnel in Sana’a have reportedly provided technical and targeting assistance for attacks on Red Sea shipping [F16]. Meanwhile, most weapons smuggling to the Houthis is now said to be routed through Chinese companies, and a Chinese satellite firm linked to the military has been accused of supplying intelligence used against commercial vessels [F17].
These internal disagreements and the inability to present a single BRICS position on the Middle‑East crisis are eroding the bloc’s claim to represent the global south against a Western‑dominated order [F18]. Analysts note that the rapid and diverse expansion of BRICS membership—celebrated by the group—has introduced a “slew of unresolved conflicts faster than it could handle them” [F19][F20].
The situation underscores how the bloc’s broadened composition is testing its cohesion at a time when control of strategic maritime routes carries significant economic and geopolitical weight.
Sources
– The Conversation, “Houthi rebels’ control of Red Sea oil chokepoint exposes deep divisions in BRICS,” September 14 2026, https://theconversation.com/houthi-rebels-control-of-red-sea-oil-chokepoint-exposes-deep-divisions-in-brics-291576
Source: The Conversation – Global
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Story synopsis gathered from: The Conversation – Global — source
