New Delhi — Despite the rapid rise of drones, precision‑guided missiles and other “high‑tech” weapons, senior Indian Army officers and defence analysts argue that armored vehicles and ground troops are still indispensable for seizing and holding territory. Their assessment, drawn from the 2022‑2023 war in Ukraine and a recent round‑table of Indian defence experts, stresses that air power and long‑range strikes can destroy targets but cannot replace the need for forces on the ground to occupy, control and administer land.
What happened
In a discussion convened by the Centre for Land Warfare Studies, senior officers—including Lieutenant General Anil Chauhan, former commander of the Western Command—said that modern combat operations in Ukraine demonstrated the limits of unmanned systems. While Russian forces deployed large numbers of drones and precision missiles, they repeatedly failed to consolidate gains after artillery and missile barrages, allowing Ukrainian forces to retake contested towns through combined‑arms tactics that integrated tanks, infantry and artillery. Indian officers cited these lessons as evidence that “air power and long‑range weapons can destroy targets, but they cannot replace the need for troops on the ground to occupy and control land.”
The panel also examined the vulnerabilities of drones and missiles. Participants noted that drones are susceptible to electronic‑warfare jamming, adverse weather and limited endurance, while missile strikes cannot guarantee the capture of an area once a target is destroyed. Consequently, the experts concluded that tanks and infantry remain the only reliable means to secure supply lines, prevent infiltration and establish a lasting presence in contested zones.
Why it matters
The emphasis on territorial control reflects a doctrinal view that the ultimate aim of war is not merely attrition but the ability to occupy and administer land. For India, which faces a spectrum of security challenges along its northern, western and eastern borders, this perspective shapes procurement and force‑structure decisions. The Ministry of Defence has earmarked roughly ₹18,000 crore for tank modernisation over the next five years, covering upgrades to the indigenous Arjun Main Battle Tank and the Russian‑origin T‑90 fleet. Officials argue that these investments complement expanding air‑defence and cyber capabilities, ensuring that the Army retains a credible conventional deterrent.
Background and context
Since the early 2000s, the Indian Army has pursued a “network‑centric” approach, integrating surveillance drones, satellite‑based intelligence and precision‑guided munitions into its order of battle. However, the Ukrainian conflict underscored that such assets, while valuable for shaping the battlefield, do not substitute for the physical presence of troops. In Ukraine, Russian forces relied heavily on long‑range fires to degrade Ukrainian positions but struggled to hold ground after the initial strikes, partly because of logistical bottlenecks and the resilience of Ukrainian combined‑arms units. By contrast, Ukrainian commanders used tanks and mechanised infantry to plug gaps, reinforce defensive lines and launch counter‑offensives that reclaimed territory.
Indian officers see a parallel in the sub‑continental context. The country’s diverse terrain—from high‑altitude passes in the Himalayas to the riverine plains of the east—requires platforms that can deliver mobility, firepower and protection across varied environments. Tanks, they argue, provide a “boots‑on‑the‑ground” capability that is essential for both conventional state adversaries and non‑state actors operating along porous borders.
Competing claims and uncertainty
Not all analysts share the same optimism about heavy armour. Some defence observers caution that the proliferation of anti‑tank guided missiles (ATGMs) and loitering munitions could erode the survivability of tank formations, especially in contested littoral or mountainous regions where line‑of‑sight is limited. Others point to the high acquisition and life‑cycle costs of main battle tanks, arguing that limited defence budgets might be better allocated to enhancing air‑defence, electronic‑warfare and unmanned systems that can operate with lower personnel footprints.
The round‑table participants acknowledged these concerns but maintained that the fundamental requirement to “hold ground” cannot be met by unmanned platforms alone. They stressed that while drones and missiles are indispensable for shaping the battlefield and degrading enemy capabilities, they must be integrated with, rather than replace, armored and infantry units. The discussion did not produce a consensus on the optimal mix of platforms, leaving open questions about how the Indian Army will balance heavy‑armor investments against emerging threats such as ATGMs and cyber‑enabled disruption of command‑and‑control networks.
What to watch next
1. Procurement milestones – The Ministry of Defence’s planned allocation of ₹18,000 crore for tank modernisation will be tracked through contracts for Arjun upgrades, T‑90 life‑extension programmes and possible acquisition of additional platforms. Timelines for delivery and field‑testing will indicate how quickly the Army can integrate these assets.
2. Doctrine revisions – Any official revisions to the Army’s “combined‑arms” doctrine, especially those that incorporate lessons from Ukraine, will reveal the weight given to tanks versus unmanned systems in future operations.
3. Counter‑ATGM capabilities – Development and fielding of active‑protection systems (APS) for Indian tanks, as well as integration of electronic‑warfare suites to disrupt enemy ATGMs, will be critical indicators of how the Army plans to mitigate the vulnerability of heavy armour.
4. Training exercises – Large‑scale joint exercises that simulate high‑intensity conventional conflict—such as the upcoming “Vajra Prahar” series—will test the interoperability of tanks, infantry, artillery, drones and cyber units, offering concrete evidence of doctrinal implementation.
5. Budget allocations – Annual defence budget statements and parliamentary committee reports will show whether the projected ₹18,000 crore earmark is sustained, increased or re‑prioritised in response to evolving threat assessments.
Conclusion
The consensus among senior Indian Army officers, as reported by The Hindu, is that tanks and ground forces remain essential for achieving the ultimate military objective of controlling territory. The Ukrainian war illustrated that precision weapons, while transformative, cannot alone secure land after a strike. For India, the strategic calculus involves balancing the proven utility of heavy armour against emerging anti‑tank threats and fiscal constraints. Ongoing procurement, doctrinal updates and capability‑testing exercises will determine whether the Indian Army can effectively integrate tanks into a modern, network‑centric force structure that meets the complex security challenges of the sub‑continent.
Sources
– “Why tanks still matter in modern warfare,” The Hindu, https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/why-tanks-still-matter-in-modern-warfare/article71182897.ece
Story synopsis gathered from: The Hindu – National — source
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