The prevailing global architecture, established in the wake of World War II and solidified after the Cold War, is facing a crisis of legitimacy and functionality. As geopolitical tensions rise and the influence of the United States wanes relative to emerging powers, scholars Aslı Bâli and Samuel Moyn argue that the current “liberal international order” is not merely decaying, but is fundamentally ill-equipped to handle the challenges of the 21st century. The central question is no longer how to repair the American-led system, but what specific framework should replace it to ensure global stability and equity.
The current discourse surrounding the “decline” of the West often focuses on the rise of China or the volatility of Russian foreign policy. However, Bâli and Moyn suggest that the instability is systemic. The American-led order was built on a paradox: it championed universal human rights and the rule of law while simultaneously maintaining a network of strategic exemptions, military interventions, and economic structures that favored the Global North. This contradiction has created a vacuum of trust, leading many nations in the Global South to seek alternatives that do not require adherence to a Western-centric moral or political blueprint.
The transition away from a unipolar world is manifesting in the proliferation of “minilateral” agreements and the expansion of blocs like BRICS. These movements represent a desire for a multipolar system where power is distributed more broadly and where international law is not applied selectively. The shift is not necessarily toward a new single hegemon, but toward a fragmented landscape of regional powers coordinating on a case-by-case basis.
Analysis: The inherent weakness of the liberal international order lies in its reliance on “exceptionalism.” For decades, the United States operated as the guarantor of global security while frequently bypassing the very institutions—such as the International Criminal Court or the UN Security Council—that it helped create. This perceived hypocrisy has eroded the “soft power” of the West, making the argument for a “rules-based order” ring hollow to nations that have experienced the externalities of Western military and economic policy. The current instability is therefore not an external attack on the order, but a delayed reaction to its internal inconsistencies.
The historical context of the current order is rooted in the Bretton Woods Agreement and the creation of the United Nations. These institutions were designed to prevent another global depression and a third world war. While they succeeded in providing a baseline of stability for several decades, they were designed by a small group of victorious powers in 1945. The demographic and economic realities of 2026 are vastly different. The Global South, which was largely marginalized or colonized during the inception of these institutions, now commands a significant portion of global GDP and population.
Furthermore, the rise of digital sovereignty and the weaponization of financial systems—such as the use of SWIFT as a tool of sanctions—have accelerated the drive for “de-dollarization.” When the tools of global commerce are used as instruments of statecraft by a single dominant power, other nations are incentivized to build parallel systems. This is not merely an economic shift but a political one, signaling a rejection of the financial hegemony that underpinned the American era.
The challenge of designing a replacement order is the risk of “competitive instability.” In a multipolar world, the absence of a single stabilizing hegemon can lead to increased regional conflicts as powers vie for influence. The transition period is particularly dangerous because the old rules are being discarded before new, mutually agreed-upon norms have been established.
Analysis: The move toward multipolarity is often framed as a binary choice between American liberalism and authoritarian alternatives. However, this framing ignores a third path: a pragmatic, non-ideological internationalism. Many nations are not seeking to export their internal political systems but are instead seeking a “transactional” global order. In this model, cooperation is based on shared interests—such as climate mitigation, pandemic prevention, and trade stability—rather than a shared commitment to a specific set of political values. This shift from “value-based” diplomacy to “interest-based” diplomacy may be the only viable way to maintain global cooperation in a diverse geopolitical landscape.
Looking forward, several key indicators will determine the shape of the successor order. First is the evolution of the BRICS+ framework. If this bloc can move beyond a loose economic alliance to create functioning alternative financial institutions and dispute-resolution mechanisms, it will provide a tangible blueprint for a post-American world. Second is the ability of the UN to undergo meaningful reform, particularly within the Security Council. If the UN remains a frozen relic of 1945, it will likely be bypassed entirely by regional security pacts.
Additionally, the role of Big Tech and supranational corporate entities must be scrutinized. As private companies gain control over the digital infrastructure of the world, they act as “shadow sovereigns.” Any new world order that focuses only on nation-states while ignoring the power of algorithmic governance and data monopolies will be incomplete. The intersection of state power and corporate influence remains one of the most significant blind spots in current geopolitical planning.
The transition away from the American-led world order is an inevitability driven by economic shifts, historical grievances, and the internal contradictions of liberal hegemony. The goal for the international community is to manage this transition in a way that prevents systemic collapse. A replacement order must be grounded in genuine inclusivity and a commitment to a legal framework that applies equally to the powerful and the marginalized.
The era of “Intelligence Without Influence” suggests that the path forward requires a rigorous, evidence-based approach to diplomacy—one that prioritizes material outcomes over ideological purity. The replacement for the current order should not be a mirror image of the old one with different actors, but a fundamentally different architecture that recognizes the plurality of the modern world.
Sources:
Bâli, A., & Moyn, S. (2026). What should replace the American-led world order? [Analysis/Discussion].
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Story synopsis gathered from: Guardian International — source
