India’s Defence Diplomacy Gains Momentum as Southeast Asia and Gulf Nations Eye Strategic Partnerships
New Delhi’s arms exports and critical mineral deals signal a shift in regional security dynamics, but questions linger over delivery timelines and geopolitical alignment.
India’s defence and security posture is drawing fresh diplomatic attention, with recent agreements spanning missile technology, air defence systems, and critical minerals suggesting a deliberate push to expand strategic influence beyond its immediate neighbourhood. While New Delhi has long positioned itself as a net security provider in the Indian Ocean, the latest deals—with Indonesia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and other regional players—hint at a broader ambition: to emerge as a credible alternative to traditional arms suppliers like Russia, the United States, and China.
The developments come at a time when global supply chains are fractured, defence budgets are rising, and middle powers are hedging their bets amid great-power competition. Yet, India’s ability to translate diplomatic overtures into sustained military cooperation remains untested, with critics pointing to past delays in defence exports and lingering questions over its capacity to scale production.
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What Happened
In the span of a week, India secured two high-profile defence-related agreements that underscore its growing appeal as a security partner.
First, during Indonesian President Joko Widodo’s visit to New Delhi in early September, India and Indonesia signed a series of memoranda of understanding (MoUs) covering agriculture, critical minerals, and—most notably—defence cooperation. While the specifics of the defence deal remain undisclosed, Reuters reported that the agreement includes the potential sale of India’s BrahMos supersonic cruise missile, a joint venture between India’s Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) and Russia’s NPO Mashinostroyeniya. The BrahMos, known for its precision and speed, has already been inducted into the Indian military and is being marketed as a “game-changer” for regional deterrence.
Second, the UAE is reportedly in advanced talks to acquire India’s BrahMos missile and the Akashteer air defence system, according to a report by The Times of India. The Akashteer, an indigenous command-and-control system for air defence, represents a newer addition to India’s export catalogue, having been operationalised by the Indian Army only in 2023. If finalised, the UAE deal would mark one of India’s largest defence exports to a Gulf nation, a region where traditional suppliers like the U.S., France, and Russia have dominated.
These agreements follow a pattern of recent defence diplomacy. In 2023, India exported military hardware worth over $2 billion, a record high, with key recipients including the Philippines (which purchased the BrahMos), Armenia (which bought the Pinaka rocket system), and Vietnam (which has expressed interest in Indian radar and missile technology). The Philippines deal, finalised in 2022, was particularly significant as it marked the first overseas sale of the BrahMos, a system co-developed with Russia.
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Why It Matters
India’s defence diplomacy carries implications for three key areas: regional security architecture, economic strategy, and great-power competition.
1. Redefining Regional Security Alliances
For decades, Southeast Asia and the Gulf have relied on extra-regional powers for their defence needs. The U.S. remains the dominant security provider in both regions, while Russia has been a major arms supplier to countries like Vietnam and Indonesia. China, too, has expanded its military footprint, particularly in the South China Sea, where its assertiveness has alarmed neighbours like the Philippines and Vietnam.
India’s push into these markets signals an attempt to offer a “third way”—a non-aligned but capable partner that can provide advanced military technology without the political baggage of great-power rivalry. For countries like Indonesia and the UAE, which have historically balanced relations with Washington, Beijing, and Moscow, India’s defence offerings could provide a useful hedge.
“India’s defence exports are not just about economics; they’re about signalling strategic autonomy,” said Dr. Rajeshwari Pillai Rajagopalan, Director of the Centre for Security, Strategy and Technology at the Observer Research Foundation. “By supplying systems like the BrahMos, India is positioning itself as a reliable partner that can deliver high-end technology without the conditionalities that often come with U.S. or Russian deals.”
2. Economic and Industrial Boost
Defence exports are a cornerstone of India’s “Make in India” initiative, which aims to transform the country into a global manufacturing hub. The government has set an ambitious target of $5 billion in annual defence exports by 2025, up from $1.5 billion in 2021. The recent deals with Indonesia and the UAE could bring India closer to this goal, while also creating jobs and fostering domestic innovation.
The BrahMos, in particular, has been a flagship product for India’s defence industry. With a range of 290 km (extendable to 450 km with modifications) and a speed of Mach 2.8, it is one of the fastest cruise missiles in the world. Its export potential is significant, given that many countries are seeking to enhance their anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities amid rising tensions in the Indo-Pacific and the Middle East.
However, India’s defence export growth faces hurdles. The country’s defence industrial base remains fragmented, with state-owned enterprises like Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) and Bharat Dynamics Limited (BDL) often struggling with delays and cost overruns. Private sector participation, while growing, is still limited compared to global defence giants like Lockheed Martin or BAE Systems.
3. Great-Power Dynamics
India’s defence diplomacy is being closely watched by Washington, Moscow, and Beijing, each of which has a stake in the region’s security architecture.
– United States: The U.S. has been supportive of India’s defence exports, seeing them as a way to counter China’s influence in the Indo-Pacific. The two countries have deepened defence ties through initiatives like the Quad (which includes Japan and Australia) and the India-U.S. Defence Technology and Trade Initiative (DTTI). However, Washington may grow wary if India’s arms sales to countries like Indonesia or Vietnam complicate its own defence relationships in the region.
– Russia: Moscow has historically been India’s largest arms supplier, accounting for nearly 50% of its defence imports over the past decade. However, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has disrupted supply chains and raised questions about its reliability as a partner. India’s efforts to diversify its defence exports—particularly of systems like the BrahMos, which has Russian components—could strain ties with Moscow, especially if India begins supplying these systems to countries that Russia views as adversaries.
– China: Beijing is likely to view India’s defence diplomacy with suspicion, particularly in Southeast Asia, where it has been expanding its military presence. China’s own defence exports, which include drones, missiles, and fighter jets, have made inroads in countries like Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Myanmar. India’s push into these markets could be seen as a direct challenge to China’s influence.
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Evidence and Source Trail
The recent deals were first reported by Reuters and The Times of India, both of which cited unnamed government sources familiar with the negotiations.
– Indonesia Deal: Reuters reported that the defence MoU signed during Widodo’s visit includes the potential sale of the BrahMos missile, though neither government has confirmed the specifics. The report noted that the deal is part of a broader effort to deepen strategic ties between India and Indonesia, which share concerns about China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea.
– UAE Deal: The Times of India reported that the UAE is in “advanced talks” to acquire the BrahMos and Akashteer systems, citing sources in the Indian defence establishment. The report suggested that the UAE’s interest stems from its desire to diversify its defence suppliers amid regional tensions, including the conflict in Yemen and the threat from Iran-backed groups.
Neither report provided details on the value of the deals or the timeline for delivery. However, past defence export agreements—such as the Philippines’ $375 million BrahMos deal in 2022—have taken years to materialise due to bureaucratic hurdles and production constraints.
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Background/Context
India’s defence diplomacy is not a new phenomenon, but it has gained momentum in recent years due to three key factors:
1. Shift from Importer to Exporter
For decades, India was the world’s largest arms importer, relying heavily on Russia, Israel, and the U.S. for its military hardware. However, since 2014, the government has pushed for self-reliance in defence production, launching initiatives like “Make in India” and offering financial incentives to domestic manufacturers. The results have been mixed: while India has reduced its import dependence, it still ranks among the top five arms importers globally, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).
2. Regional Security Challenges
India’s defence exports are closely tied to its strategic interests in the Indo-Pacific. The country has been vocal about the need for a “free, open, and inclusive” Indo-Pacific, a vision that aligns with the U.S. but also reflects its own concerns about China’s growing naval presence. By supplying advanced military systems to countries like the Philippines and Vietnam, India is seeking to build a coalition of like-minded states that can act as a counterbalance to China.
3. Diversification of Defence Partnerships
India’s defence relationships have traditionally been dominated by Russia, but the war in Ukraine has forced New Delhi to diversify its partnerships. The U.S. has emerged as a key defence partner, with bilateral trade in defence equipment exceeding $20 billion since 2008. India has also deepened ties with France, Israel, and Japan, all of which have contributed to its defence modernisation.
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Competing Claims and Uncertainty
While the recent deals have generated optimism, several questions remain unanswered:
1. Delivery Timelines
India has a history of delays in defence production and exports. The BrahMos deal with the Philippines, for instance, was signed in 2022 but is yet to be fully executed. Similar delays have plagued other defence projects, raising concerns about India’s ability to meet its export commitments.
2. Geopolitical Risks
The BrahMos missile, which has Russian components, could face sanctions under the U.S. Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA). While the U.S. has so far waived sanctions on India for its defence purchases from Russia, future sales of the BrahMos to countries like Indonesia or the UAE could complicate matters.
3. Competition from Other Suppliers
India is not the only country vying for defence contracts in Southeast Asia and the Gulf. The U.S., France, and Russia all have well-established defence relationships in these regions, and China’s defence exports are growing rapidly. India’s ability to compete will depend on its ability to offer competitive pricing, reliable delivery, and after-sales support.
4. Domestic Production Capacity
India’s defence industrial base remains a bottleneck. While the government has taken steps to streamline procurement and encourage private sector participation, the country’s defence production is still dominated by state-owned enterprises, which are often plagued by inefficiencies. Scaling up production to meet export demand will require significant investment and reform.
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What to Watch Next
Several developments will shape the trajectory of India’s defence diplomacy in the coming months:
1. Execution of Existing Deals
The most immediate test will be India’s ability to deliver on its existing defence export agreements, particularly the BrahMos deal with the Philippines. Any further delays could undermine confidence in India’s reliability as a defence partner.
2. Expansion of Defence Exports
India is reportedly in talks with several other countries, including Vietnam, Malaysia, and Saudi Arabia, for defence deals. The outcome of these negotiations will indicate whether India can sustain its momentum in defence exports.
3. U.S.-India Defence Cooperation
The U.S. has been supportive of India’s defence exports, but this could change if India’s deals with countries like Indonesia or the UAE are seen as undermining U.S. interests. The upcoming 2+2 ministerial dialogue between India and the U.S. will provide clues about the future of their defence partnership.
4. Russia’s Reaction
Moscow has so far been silent on India’s defence exports, but this could change if India begins supplying systems like the BrahMos to countries that Russia views as adversaries. Any backlash from Russia could complicate India’s defence procurement plans, particularly for systems that rely on Russian components.
5. China’s Response
China is likely to monitor India’s defence diplomacy closely, particularly in Southeast Asia. If India’s exports gain traction, Beijing could respond by offering its own defence systems at discounted rates or by increasing its military presence in the region.
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Conclusion
India’s recent defence deals with Indonesia and the UAE mark a significant step in its efforts to emerge as a major arms exporter and a net security provider in the Indo-Pacific and beyond. The agreements reflect a broader strategic shift—one that seeks to leverage India’s growing defence industrial base to build partnerships with countries seeking alternatives to traditional great-power suppliers.
Yet, the road ahead is fraught with challenges. India’s ability to deliver on its export commitments, navigate geopolitical complexities, and compete with established defence suppliers will determine whether its defence diplomacy can move from rhetoric to reality. For now, the deals signal intent, but the true test will be in their execution.
Source: Reporting based on Reuters and The Times of India, with additional context from SIPRI and Observer Research Foundation.
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